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ABSTRACT
Attackers take advantage of any security breach to pene-
trate an organisation perimeter and exploit hosts as stepping
stones to reach valuable assets, deeper in the network. The
exploitation of hosts is possible not only when vulnerabilities
in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software components are
present, but also, for example, when an attacker acquires a
credential on one host which allows exploiting further hosts
on the network. Finding attacks involving the latter case re-
quires the ability to represent dynamic models. In fact, more
dynamic aspects are present in the network domain such as
attackers accumulate resources (i.e. credentials) along an
attack, and users and assets may move from one environ-
ment to another, although always constrained by the ruling
of the network. In this paper we address these dynamic
issues by presenting MsAMS (Multi-step Attack Modelling
and Simulation), an implemented framework, based on Mo-
bile Ambients, to discover attacks in networks. The idea of
ambients fits naturally into this domain and has the advan-
tage of providing flexibility for modelling. Additionally, the
concept of mobility allows the simulation of attackers ex-
ploiting opportunities derived either from the exploitation
of vulnerable and non-vulnerable hosts, through the acquisi-
tion of credentials. It also allows expressing security policies
embedded in the rules of the ambients.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized access
General Terms
Security, Management
Keywords
Network Attack, Vulnerability Assessment, Attack Graph,
Hypergraph
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1. INTRODUCTION
One single hole in the network perimeter is enough to al-
low an attacker to penetrate the network and exploit hosts
as stepping stones to reach valuable assets. Defenders need
to tune into the mindset of attackers [29] to track those
possible stepping stones and manage the trade-off between
impact of attacks and cost of countermeasures. This task is
rather challenging due to the complexity and size of current
networks, and due to the variety of opportunities and strate-
gies used by attackers. For example, attackers do not only
take advantage of vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) software components but can also take advantage
of credentials (i.e. any information used for access control)
acquired dynamically while the attack is taking place. Such
credentials greatly increase an attacker spectrum of possi-
bilities since he gains the ability to exploit safe, i.e. not
vulnerable, hosts as well. Therefore, attackers are dynamic,
and rational, entities which “move” towards the resources of
a victim; they accumulate resources along an attack, such
as the knowledge of credentials. Furthermore, users and re-
sources of a network might also “move”; in any case they are
bound to the security policies enforced by the network. For
example, an employee might switch from working with his
laptop in the office or at home, but anyway he is subject to
the ruling of the network which allows the access to some re-
sources just from within the office environment. To the best
of our knowledge, models which represent a snapshot of a
network, such as Attack Graphs [14, 1, 15, 23, 32, 20, 25,
31, 34], are unable to deal with all these dynamic aspects.
We address these dynamic issues by proposing MsAMS, a
framework for modelling and simulation of network attacks,
the design of which draws heavily on Cardelli’s work on Mo-
bile Ambients [5, 6] and formal biology [4], and on Milner’s
work on bigraphs [21]. In this framework, a network is
viewed as a so-called Ambient containing other ambients,
such as subnets, hosts, and firewalls, on a tree hierarchical
structure. As further explained in the paper, an Ambient
defines a hyperedge [16] which represents the idea that a
communication performed over it is seen by each ambient
in that hyperedge, thus no link between sibling hosts (be-
longing to a same ambient) is required. Besides, an ambient
boundary may contain rules which allow its interaction with
other ambients, resulting in changes on the rules of the am-
bients involved. After the modelling is complete, MsAMS
simulates an attacker (also an Ambient) dynamically finding
an attack path allowed by the modelled ambients and their
embedded rules.
We see this framework very much as a working tool whose
users are security practitioners, such as network administra-
tors. It allows them to gain knowledge about their network.
It also permits zooming in some parts of the network they
want to investigate, and zooming out to a more abstract
level of network as a whole. MsAMS is flexible enough to
allow the modelling of a network in different ways and with
more or less details, at the discretion of the person using it.
MsAMS does not require complex sets of pre- and postcon-
ditions to model the composition of vulnerabilities in consec-
utive attack steps, as it happens with other approaches [15,
8, 33]. In fact, it uses the access-to-effect paradigm used
by other researchers (e.g. [14, 20]) which can be obtained
from the NVD [24]. Modelling the input requires (i) the
network configuration, (ii) vulnerabilities in COTS present
in the network which can be obtained automatically from
vulnerability scanning tools such as Nessus [22], and (iii)
their attributes, which can be obtained from vulnerability
databases such as the NVD [24].
The paper is organised as follows. A running example is
introduced in Section 2, followed by review of related work
in Section 3. An overview of the MsAMS framework is de-
scribed in Sections 4 and 5, using the running example pre-
viously presented. In Section 6, we introduce the concept
of exposure and describe acquisition of credentials, using an
insider attack example. An overview of the heuristic algo-
rithms implemented to find attacks is provided in Section 7,
and results are reported in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9,
we conclude and list future work.
2. RUNNING EXAMPLE
We use the network illustrated in Figure 1 from Ingols et
al. [14] as the basis for introducing core concepts and to give
an overview of the MsAMS framework.
In this example network the attacker is initially located
on host A and wants to reach either host E or F. The firewall
only allows traffic from host C or D to host E. Additionally,
all hosts have a single open port with a vulnerable service
running. Each vulnerability is remotely exploitable and al-
lows the attacker to gain privileged access to the host.
The example network can be represented in terms of Am-
bient as illustrated in Figure 2(a). In the figure, we see an
ambient net containing five ambients A, B, C, D, FW , which
represent hosts A to D and firewall FW . The firewall is
viewed as a membrane protecting other ambients, i.e. hosts,
E and F . Figure 2(b) provides a zoom view of ambient
A. This ambient contains an ambient representing a listen-
ing service sv A, containing itself an ambient representing a
vulnerability v A on that service. The exploitation of v A
results in the acquisition of privilege admin (OS admin A)
over host A Operating System.
Notice that we presented above one intuitive way of mod-
elling the example network. However, this is not at all the
only option since MsAMS is flexible. For example, the fire-
wall could be modelled as well as an ambient which inter-
faces with two ambients representing subnets (A, B, C, D)
and (E, F ).
3. RELATEDWORK
The MsAMS framework has basically the same objective
as an Attack Graph, both show “the ways an attacker can
compromise a network or host” [14]. Therefore, we consider
Attack Graphs as our main source of related work, although
we take the novel approach that finding attacks is a multi-
objective optimisation problem.
Ou et al. [26] use Datalog rules in the MulVAL tool for
modelling the input required for the generation of Attack
Graphs. A Prolog reasoning engine then captures the rela-
tionship among those with further rules and generates the
graph. Their framework, like ours, has a formal approach
for input specification and for reasoning. Recent work from
Sawilla and Ou [28] also uses the same running example as
we do, illustrated on Figure 1, and the graph produced by
MulVAL is shown in [28, Page 3]. Thus, we compare their
approach and ours more closely. Their graph has 50 nodes
while ours has 27 nodes 1. This significant difference may
be explained by the presence of redundant nodes in the for-
mer graph, such as the ones related to firewall rules (C > E
and D > E). Firewall rules, modelled as “hacl” clauses in
MulVAL, appear twelve times in the graph. In our approach
the Ambient firewall appears once in the graph but contains
two filtering rules at its boundary, as it happens in reality.
NetSPA tool [14, 34] uses a so-called Multiple-Prerequisite
(MP) graph to represent (i) state, i.e. the attacker level of
access on a host, (ii) prerequisite, i.e. reachability or a cre-
dential needed for exploiting a vulnerability, and (iii) vul-
nerability instance. Prerequisites allow the exploitation of
vulnerabilities, and when the attacker reaches a vulnerabil-
ity, a change in the attacker state occurs. “Outbound edges
from prerequisite nodes point to the vulnerability instances
that require the prerequisite for successful exploitation” [34].
Therefore, they only represent hosts which contain vulner-
abilities and their concept of credential differs from ours.
We consider as a credential any information used for access
control (e.g. passwords, public session keys) required to en-
ter/log into a host, vulnerable or not. This way we can
represent normal and abnormal behaviours of a network.
Jajodia, Noel et al. [15] rely on detailed pre- and postcon-
dition rules to compose attack steps. The specification of
these conditions enables TVA tool to find attacks composed
both by vulnerable and non-vulnerable hosts (as illustrated
in example on [15, Page 258], where host ned is not vul-
nerable). However, this is achieved as a consequence of the
postcondition enabled by the exploitation of the preceding
vulnerability, requiring a detailed analysis of dependencies
among vulnerabilities. We have a different perspective and
use a more simplistic approach, based on access-to-effect, to
model vulnerabilities, but nevertheless consider the possi-
bility of an attacker acquiring credentials which enable the
compromise of non-vulnerable hosts.
Sheyner and Wing [31] provide a toolkit based on sym-
bolic model checker. Like other model checker-based ap-
proaches [27], state explosion [3] is an issue. These graphs
represent a path for every single possible combination of at-
tack steps, thus its complexity becomes exponential. Our
approach does not suffer from this problem since the graph
only represents nodes (i.e. Ambients) and links which occur
in practice, and the composition of attack steps relies on the
matching of rules embedded on the boundaries of ambients.
Sheyner also models trust relations among hosts. It means
that the credential for a host h1 gives the attacker access to
host h2 as well, if these two hosts trust each other. There-
fore, the real-life situation that my password gives someone
1Eight nodes illustrated in Figure 2(a) and additional three
nodes for each host, as illustrated for host A in Figure 2(b),
plus one attacking node
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Figure 2: Modelling the example network as Ambients
access to my account, not to another account, in my work-
station can be represented with MsAMS but cannot with
their approach.
Ha, Chinchani et al. [12, 7] propose a type of graph which
allows not only the modelling but also the simulation of
an attacker searching through the graph. Nodes are as-
sociated with tokens and edges associated with minimum
and maximum costs. Similar to MsAMS, this method can
represent/model many types of nodes (e.g. firewalls, vul-
nerabilities, services, and accounts). During the simulation
process, the attacker acquires tokens, and if he has a token
he incurs on minimum cost to traverse an edge, otherwise on
maximum cost. This approach has many similarities with
our approach, e.g., it allows modelling insiders which “hold”
tokens (i.e. credentials) at the beginning of an attack, but
it does not allow the representation of Access Control Lists,
and the acquisition of credentials along an attack path.
Gorodetski and Kotenko [11] have a grammar-based ap-
proach for the simulation of attacks in networks. A family
of grammars for each attacker intention has to be speci-
fied and, when instantiated, generates attack paths. Among
other characteristics, their approach differs from ours be-
cause they do not have the objective of discovering attacks
given a network model.
4. MODELLINGWITH THEMSAMS FRA-
MEWORK
We have seen in Section 2 the network topology of the ex-
ample network represented in terms of ambients. In essence
Ambients are environments where any computing activity
can happen. They are abstractions introduced to represent
hosts, services, vulnerabilities, networks, users and even cre-
dentials. Each ambient can possibly interact with other am-
bients in its neighbourhood, depending on its and theirs
capabilities.
Definition 1. An Ambient Amb is a tuple (AmbList,
Rules), where AmbList is a list of ambients contained in
Amb, and Rules is a list of static rules defining the dynamic
behaviour of ambient Amb.
We use the notation Amb : [AmbList][Rules]. The am-
bients of the network example, illustrated in Figure 2, are
specified in MsAMS as follows.
1 net: ["A" "B" "C" "D" "FW"] []
2 FW: ["E" "F"] [Repeat (AllowIn "C" "sv_E"),
Repeat (AllowIn "D" "sv_E")]
3 A: ["sv_A" "OS_admin_A"]
[Repeat (AllowIn "net" "sv_A")]
4 sv_A: ["v_A"] [Repeat (Accept "net")]
5 v_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "sv_A")]
6 OS_admin_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "v_A")]
Similar rules as 3-6 apply to ambients B-F
In this example we use three primitives, as described next.
1. The primitive Repeat allows the execution of a capa-
bility which follows, on an infinite loop.
2. The primitive Accept allows one ambient to accept that
another ambient moves into it. The intention of enter-
ing an ambient is expressed in terms of the primitive
Enter, used for example for simulating the actions of
an attacker.
3. The AllowIn primitive allows one ambient to define
which ambient is allowed to cross its boundaries to-
wards another ambient. Although this rule can be
modelled using Enter and Accept, it has been explicitly
introduced in MsAMS for convenience when modelling
firewalls and ports which allow access to listening ser-
vices in hosts.
Details about the specification of ambients provided above
by rules 1-6 follows.
• Line 1 specifies the ambient net. It contains five other
ambients and no action rules.
• Line 2 specifies the ambient FW which contains two
other ambients. It restricts the broadcasting of mes-
sages from hosts A-D towards its children ambients,
allowing only ambients C and D to communicate with
ambient sv E. AllowIn AmbientSource AmbientDesti-
nation may restrict communication between any pair
of ambients. For example, if we had defined that am-
bients A to D were inside ambient “dmz”, we could
have firewall rules of the type: AllowIn “dmz′′ “F ′′
or AllowIn “ssh/tcp/22′′ “sv E′′.
• Line 3 specifies ambient A containing two other ambi-
ents, a listening service sv A and a privileged account
OS admin A. It contains a rule representing a port
which allows the communication from the network net
to service sv A.
• Line 4 specifies ambient sv A, containing a vulnera-
bility represented by the ambient v A. This service
is continuously accepting ambient net. It means that
anyone allowed in the network net can enter, i.e. re-
quest, sv A.
• Line 5 specifies an empty ambient v A. Since this vul-
nerability is remotely exploitable, it does not require
an attacker to be authenticated as a user of the host
to enable its exploitation. Thus, it accepts ambient
sv A directly. Besides, this vulnerability results in the
acquisition of admin 2 privilege.
• Line 6 specifies an empty ambient OS admin A. This
ambient is continuously accepting ambient v A.
It is important to keep in mind that this example is over-
simplified. For example, it only represents one type of priv-
ilege over the Operating System and no access control.
4.1 Matching Enter/Accept
In Cardelli’s Bioware Languages [4], an Ambient (called
membrane in that paper) can possibly contain other Am-
bients inside it. In that sense, an Ambient has a set of
children and a parent. Cardelli defines two conditions that
must both be satisfied for an Ambient X to move into an
Ambient Y :
1. X is a sibling of Y or X and Y are children of sibling
parents.
2. X has an action request entry into Y , which we denote
Enter “Y”, and Y allows the entry movement with an
action Accept “X”.
We replace in MsAMS framework the first condition with:
X is a sibling of Y or X and Y are children of sibling
parents, or an edge exists connecting X and Y .
5. SIMULATIONSWITHMSAMS FRAME-
WORK
The architecture of the MsAMS framework and where the
simulation engine fits is illustrated in Figure 3.
The simulation engine receives as input (i) network as am-
bients, i.e. a tree hierarchical structure defining the network
2Admin access represents generically privileged access to the
operating system, for example root access to Unix-based,
and administrator access to Windows-based systems.
topology (similar to Figure 2) and a hypergraph defining
broadcast communication, (ii) a set of static rules determin-
ing Capabilities and Actions, as shown in Section 4. These
rules can be used by the ambient and can be performed
at the boundary that the ambient defines. The set of ac-
tions implicitly defines a non-deterministic choice of action
to perform, and (iii) a set of computing Agents, i.e. one
or more attacker ambients. The engine then performs two
basic tasks using heuristics, as described in Section 7. First,
it assigns automatically value and cost to ambients of the
hypergraph. Second, it computes possible steps an attacker
can perform on the ranked hypergraph. Each of these steps
can either be accepted, if the actions of the attacker (ambi-
ent) and the actions of other ambients match, as described
in Section 4.1, or rejected if the actions do not match. This
match is achieved via reduction rules [5]. A match means
that the attack can actually perform the step, and this is
recorded by the engine. In the end of the simulation, we
have the attacker complete trace until a target, i.e. a host
of high value, is reached. This trace is a possible multi-step
attack on the modelled network. An attacker trace for the
running example (see Figure 2) is illustrated next.
Enter "sv_D"
Enter "sv_E"
Enter "v_E"
Enter "OS_admin_E"
This trace shows the possible attack ADE. Another pos-
sibility which can be obtained by executing further the sim-
ulation is ACE. Note that vulnerabilities v A and v D were
not exploited because the attacker had more incentive to ex-
ploit vulnerability v E which leads to OS admin E, a higher
value ambient.
6. ACQUISITION OF CREDENTIALS
In this section we use an insider attack example, more
appropriate for illustrating the acquisition of credentials in
MsAMS. However, first we introduce the concept of expo-
sure.
6.1 The role of exposures
We use exposures to represent stealthy ways to acquire
credentials. An attacker can get remote or local access to
a host by means of vulnerabilities but, most of the times,
he does not automatically obtain credentials (e.g passwords
or private session keys) for that host. Thus, an exposure
is an abstraction to model the availability of credentials. It
corresponds to the real situation of passwords saved locally,
and passwords acquired using key logging mechanisms or
social engineering. However, exposures can also be used
for modelling Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), as shown
in Section 6.2. To illustrate this concept let’s consider the
scenario shown in Figure 4.
There are two ways to penetrate host h, either via lo-
gin using a credential, i.e. passwords p.us (user) and p.ad
(admin), or via vulnerability v. In this case, v is a remote-
to-user vulnerability since it is accessible from any host on
the internet and results in user privilege gained over the
host Operating System. However, the host also contains an
exposure exp which is forever repeating the action of releas-
ing credential p.ad. The capabilities which constraint this
scenario are listed next.
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Figure 3: Architecture of the MsAMS framework
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Figure 4: Example of exposure
1 int: ["alice.h" "net"] []
2 net: ["u1" "u2" "h"] [Repeat (Accept "int")]
3 h: ["p.ad" "OS.ad" "p.us" "OS.us" "v" "exp"]
[Repeat (Accept "int")]
4 p.ad: [] [Repeat (Accept "u1")]
5 OS.ad: [] [Repeat (Accept "p.ad")]
6 p.us: [] [Repeat (Accept "u2")]
7 OS.us: [] [Repeat (Accept "p.us"),
Repeat (Accept "v")]
8 v: [] [Repeat (Accept "int")]
9 exp: [] [Repeat (Accept "OS.us"),
Repeat (ReleaseCred "p.ad")]
10 alice.h: [] [Repeat (Accept "alice")]
11 u1: [] [Repeat (Enter "p.ad")]
12 u2:[] [Repeat (Enter "p.us")]
In this case, the computing agent is an ambient alice,
and it has the initial action Enter “alice.h”. Although the
list of actions generated by the engine is non-deterministic,
let’s suppose the following actions were generated: (i) Enter
“v”, and (ii) AcquireCred “p.ad”. In this case, a match be-
tween AcquireCred “p.ad” and ReleaseCred “p.ad” can hap-
pen. This match represents the acquisition of a credential.
It occurs by means of reduction rules [5], when agents are
computed. This computation has two consequences: 1- [Re-
peat (Accept “alice”)] is included on the capability list of
ambient p.ad, and 2- ambient alice acquires credential p.ad,
allowing her to enter host h with admin privilege.
After being captured by an ambient, a credential is forever
kept in the ambient set of Credentials. This list of credentials
can be seen as an abstraction of a “bag of credentials” which
an attacker can accumulate along a multi-step attack. We
assume that the monotonicity property [2] holds (as many
other researchers [14, 1, 15, 20] do) and, therefore, once
acquired a credential is never lost, i.e. the attacker does not
need to backtrack to re-acquire a credential.
A possible attack trace is presented next.
Enter "alice.h"
Enter "v"
AcquireCred "p.ad"
Enter "p.ad"
Enter "OS.ad"
6.2 An example of insider attack
Figure 5 shows an example of public key acquisition using
a Public Key Infrastructure (pki). This example has been
adapted from [7]. In this example, we use generically the
term key instead of credential to denote session keys, and
passwords.
The environment is a Bank with a set of teller hosts,
represented by teller0 and teller1, a manager host, and a
database, DB. There is a key to access the manager host,
managerKey. The DB ambient has an user ambient, dbUser,
that users can access through In/Out sequences. Primitives
“In” and “Out” establish communication between two ambi-
ents representing, for example, the ability to read and write.
Hence, the primitive Seq (line 4) indicates sequences of read-
write, repeated forever. It has also a file system, dbFS, and
an administrator account, DBA. Outside the bank, a PKI
ambient gives a ticket for a DB session. Only the manager
has access to the pkiKey.
The general rule for each ambient is that an ambient is a
hyperedge connecting each ambient inside it. Notice that a
list of actions denotes a nondeterministic choice.
Ambients in the example are specified as follows.
1 Bank: ["teller0" "teller1" "managerVuln" "dbUserKey"
"dbaKey" "managerKey" "manager" "DB"] []
2 DB: ["dbFS" "dbUser" "DBA"] [Repeat (Accept "Bank")]
3 dbFS: [] [Repeat (Accept "DBA"),
Repeat (Seq (In "dbUser") (Out "dbUser")]
4 dbUser: [] [Repeat (Accept "dbUserKey")]
5 dbUserKey: [] [Repeat (Accept "teller0"),
Repeat (Accept "teller1")]
6 DBA: [] [Repeat (Accept "managerVuln"),
Repeat (Accept "dbaKey")]
7 dbaKey: [] []
8 managerVuln: [] [Repeat (Accept "Bank")]
9 manager: [Repeat (Enter "managerKey")]
10 managerKey: [] [Repeat (Accept "manager")]
11 PKI: ["pkiKey" "exp.dbaKey"] []
12 pkiKey: [Repeat (Accept "manager")]
13 exp.dbaKey: [Repeat (Accept "pkiKey"),
Repeat (ReleaseCred "dbaKey")]
Bank
DB PKI
teller0
managerVuln
teller1
DBAdbUserdbFS
dbaKeydbUserKey manager
pkiKey
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exp.dbaKey
Figure 5: Modelling the insider attack example as Ambients
14 teller0: [] [Repeat (Enter "dbUserKey")]
15 teller1: [] [Repeat (Enter "dbUserKey")]
The DBA can be entered through a vulnerability, e.g. En-
ter “managerVuln”, or by having a Enter “dbaKey” capabil-
ity which can be acquired by:
• using a capability AcquireCred ”exp.dbaKey”, or
• giving some ambient the capability Enter ”dbaKey”
from the start.
7. HEURISTICS USED TO FIND ATTACKS
In a previous paper [9], we introduced the idea of rep-
resenting attacks using a language based on CSP [13]. In
that paper, we assumed that a network model was a graph
with values assigned to nodes and costs assigned to edges.
Searching for an attack was treated as an optimisation prob-
lem. In the present approach we still assume that values are
assigned to ambients and we still have a cost measure for
moves from ambient to ambient. However, we have devel-
oped algorithms for assigning values and costs. Borrowing
from social network analysis [30] and page ranking we as-
sign value to an ambient proportional to the value assigned
to other ambients that point to it. An ambient A points to
an ambient B when a move from the former into the latter
is possible.
An algorithm based on PageRank [19] computes a score
for each ambient in a network model. That score, authority,
can be considered as the value for the ambients. The compu-
tation starts with a square matrix where cell (i, j) contains
a zero when there is no link from i to j, and one otherwise.
The search for an attack uses the values assigned to all ambi-
ents in the network model, computed using PageRank, and
an initial set of suspicious ambients, the ambients where the
attacker would be located. The algorithm can also be given
a set of ambients that could be considered as hints in the
sense that we expect that an attack would use them. This
can be useful when a network administrator wants to know
if the network is subject to a specific attack, as for example
the massive RealPlayer exploit via SQL injection, reported
by the press in January 2008 [17].
The search algorithm computes in each step the set of all
possible moves, ordering them by a priority scheme, that is
akin to the cost value used in [9]. To compute the value of
a move, the PageRank algorithm is extended with the con-
cept of hub, borrowed from HITS (Hypertext Induced Topic
Search) [18]. A hub is an ambient that can be source of a
move. An ambient A has high hub score when it is possi-
ble to move from A to ambients with high value. In a local
network, the file system where every user has her home di-
rectory should have a high asset (authority) rank. Assuming
that each user gets access to the home directory using NFS
(Network File System) service, an ambient modelling the
NFS would have both high authority (accessed by all users)
and high hub score, because the NFS uses the file system
to satisfy each user request. The HITS algorithm assigns
both authority and hub score to a set of ambients, given
their neighbourhood, and an initial set of values for them.
The search algorithm selects a fixed subset of the hubbiest
ambients, and proceeds in depth-first search, giving priority
to moves with high scoring authorities.
8. PERFORMANCEANDSCALABILITYOF
MSAMS FRAMEWORK
The time for computing an attack is dominated by the
computation of assets ranks and hub scores. This is per-
formed by an algorithm based on the PageRank algorithm [19],
and the query-independent HITS (Hypertext Induced Topic
Search) algorithm [18]. A na¨ıve implementation of either
PageRank or HITS can take O(n3), demanding a O(n2)
matrix multiplication in each cycle. A more efficient im-
plementation, however, takes into account the fact that the
adjacency matrix is sparse and that the matrix multiplica-
tion performed in each cycle can be executed in O(n). As-
suming that n is the number of ambients represented, our
implementation precomputes the matrix in O(n2), and then
applies ranking algorithm in time that ranges from O(kn) to
O(kn2), depending on the density of the adjacency matrix
and on k, the number of iterations necessary for convergence
of the power method applied to the computation of either
PageRank or the modified HITS. It is important to notice
that even for a matrix with billions of nodes the PageRank
algorithm tends to converge in less than a hundred iteration.
In our tests it converged in less than sixty cycles for a test
with 8000 nodes. In a previous implementation [10] we used
a full matrix multiplication and fixed k, obtaining running
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Figure 6: Performance of the MsAMS framework
times of O(n3) when using more than 8000 nodes. Currently,
we have an implementation in Haskell using a sparse matrix
multiplication and a matrix akin to the Google matrix [19].
The whole process of both ranking (with HITS and PageR-
ank) and searching for an attack executes in less than 30
seconds for a network with more than 8000 nodes.
Figure 6 shows the computing time for experiments with
a variation on our running example illustrated in Figure 2,
performed on a machine with Intel Core 2 Duo T5250, 1.5
GHz processor, 2 GB RAM. In all experiments we used
one percent of the total of nodes to the left of the fire-
wall. Therefore, we used the following variation of nodes
to the left and right of the firewall, respectively: (4,512),
(8,1024), (16,2048), (32,4096), and (64,8192). That choice
generates a dense adjacency submatrix for the part of the
model representing the right side of the firewall. All exper-
iments assumed the attacker positioned initially inside host
A.
We express the network models input of our framework
in a dedicated language that has also been implemented in
Haskell. The 8256 nodes network used in the experiments,
e.g., is described in this language with just 46 lines. It takes
7.18 seconds to compile those lines into the internal repre-
sentation used by PageRank and HITS algorithms.
9. CONCLUSION AND FURTHERWORK
We presented in this paper the MsAMS framework based
on the Mobile Ambients theory. It allows the modelling of
a network in an intuitive way as Ambients, and the spec-
ification of static rules defining the dynamic behaviour of
each ambient. Then, an engine based on heuristics, simu-
lates attackers steps to find attacks which are possible, given
the network modelled. The dynamic aspect of MsAMS al-
lows the simulation of an attacker with the ability to com-
pose attack steps either from the exploitation of vulnerable
and non-vulnerable hosts, and the ability to accumulate re-
sources along the way. Firewalls are modelled as intuitively
as ambients with filtering rules.
Note that the graph generated has as many nodes as the
number of ambients modelled, since no artificial entities are
created to model the reality of the network. This facilitates
the relation between the model and the real network topol-
ogy.
One advantage of the framework is its flexibility. It is
up to its users, such as network administrators, to decide
which level of details is needed. They can decompose the
network at their discretion and model either fine grained
entities and relationships, including ACLs (Access Control
Lists), or abstract to a higher level and only model the min-
imum which still allows them to find possible attacks on the
network modelled. Alternatively, they can adopt the latter
option first as a way to prioritise a sub-graph of interest,
and then adopt the former to zoom in this sub-graph.
Usability is an aspect that needs to be improved and,
therefore, is listed for future work. We plan to build an user
interface to allow the graphical manipulation of Ambients,
when modelling, and the visualisation of possible attacks
discovered by the framework, when simulating. Besides, we
plan on continuing with testing to fine-tune the approach.
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